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Pragmatist Perspectives on a Precarious Relation
Ana Honnacker
 
1. Introduction: Too Little, Too Late? 
1 With the Fridays for Future movement, environmental activism reached another level.
What started with a single young Swedish woman skipping school once in a week in
order to protest against climate change became a global phenomenon quickly: Young
people  from  all  over  the  world  followed  Greta  Thunberg’s  example  and  joined  for
“school  strikes  for  climate”  every  Friday.  The  strikes  got  increasingly  more  media
coverage, and so did climate change itself. Not only the public awareness grew, but also
the  public  support.  On September  20th 2019,  at  least  4 million people  were  on the
streets all over the world, marching for an environmental policy that does no longer
ignore the crisis of global warming any longer and responds adequately.
2 The sheer mass of people combined with the fact that the protesters represented not
only a small “green” community but were of all ages and came from all kinds of social
and political backgrounds engendered political pressure. If ecological issues appear as
demands brought forward only by special interest groups, they can easily be treated as
incommodious appendixes in political debates (if they are discussed at all). If they are,
instead, articulated by a broad coalition of citizens, it is far harder to mark them as
elitist. If, then, environmental questions are presented as questions of common good as
well  as self-fulfillment,  of  justice and well-being and – in the long run – even bare
survival, it is rather striking that they haven’t been a major concern (and more: at top
of the political agenda) for most nations for the most part. This is especially true for
democratic societies.
3 For some of those who strive for “greener” politics, the last observation sheds doubt on
the capability of democracies to deal with the climate crises properly. Whether it is due
to a lack of willingness to risk re-elections by drawing unpopular decisions on the side
of  politicians or  because of  the myopic  focus on economic well-being and personal
freedoms  (like  buying  and  driving  SUVs  or  eating  cheap  meat)  on  the  side  of  the
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citizens, or a mixture of both – democratic systems seem to fail in face of large-scale
and apparently  distant  problems.  This  alleged failure  can be  described in  terms of
efficiency  and  morality,  and  often  both  aspects  mingle  in  feeding  the  “green
skepticism”  towards  democracy.  Whereas  the  first  reservation  aims  more  at  the
functional level, assuming that democratic procedures are inert and dependent on the
public  opinion in a way that  determines them to respond “too little,  too late,”  the
second reservation questions the intrinsic value of democracy. 
4 Especially  with  regard  to  a  certain  frustration  within  environmental  circles,  the
longing looks in the direction of states like China or Singapore which have the political
means to implement environmental policies rather authoritarian, and therefore quick
and efficient, are no big surprise.1 Yet there are also much stronger and more explicit
claims that present democracies, or even democracies in general, are not able to do
what  is  necessary  (and  also  morally  right)  with  regard  to  our  dealings  with  the
environment and future generations.  Roger Hallam, co-founder of  the more radical
movement  Extinction  Rebellion,  produced  popular  outrage  when  he  stated  in  an
interview: “When a society engages in morally corrupt activities, democracy becomes
irrelevant.”2
5 Although there  are  good reasons  to  understand statements  like  these  not  as  blunt
rejection,  but  as  radical  criticism  of  environmental  politics  pursued  by  current
democratic  governments,  and  therefore  as  an  attempt  to  realize  more  democratic
politics,3 they  are  often  taken  as  evidence  of  anti-democratic  tendencies  in
environmentalism.  This  paper  will,  in  a  first  step,  examine  those  traits  in
environmental thinking that suggest to see it in conflict with democracy.
6 Drawing on what can be learned from their sometimes harsh criticism of democratic
politics as well as from an analysis where they really depart from democratic grounds,
the elements of  an “ecological  democracy” will  be outlined in a  second step.  If  we
follow  the  pragmatist  idea  that  democracy  is,  on  the  one  hand,  the  best  way  of
organizing a society in order to pursue collective problem-solving, and, on the other
hand,  has  an  intrinsic  value  as  a  form  of  life  that  allows  for  a  maximum  of  self-
realization and at the same time fosters the common good, deepening democracy is a
precondition  for  tackling  the  environmental  crisis.  We  need  a  fundamental
transformation that has to be not only accepted but actively designed and supported by
(and, indeed lived by) citizens.
 
2. Environmentalism and Democracy: Criticism and 
Departures
7 Since the beginnings of the environmental movement, its relation to democracy was
contested,  both  by  its  proponents  and  its  opponents.  Though  there  is  no  unified
environmentalism in the sense of a systematic and coherent theoretical framework, it
may be  said  that  the  diverse  rationales,  be  it  in  philosophical  accounts  or  mission
statements, have a common direction of impact: they object to the status quo. The way
we handle life-sustaining resources, the way we trade, consume, eat, move, the way we
relate to other-than-humans, in short: the way we treat nature, is questioned and the
need to act differently is stated. Consequently, activist as well as theorists have to take
position with regard to how to induce change in behaviour, or how to implement more
Environmentalism and Democracy
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-2 | 2020
2
environmental-friendly laws, that is,  they have to choose their (in the widest sense
political) means.
8 An underlying motif of arguments against those challenges of the state of things is the
reproach  of  a  general  anti-liberal  thinking.  Environmental  demands  are  said  to  be
restrictions that conflict with the individual interest and thereby the freedom of the
citizens.  Rather  mild  suggestions  like  that  of  one  vegetarian  weekday  in  public
canteens (“Veggieday”) or a limitation of speed on highways brought forward by the
German  Green  Party  were  massively  objected  as  manifestations  of  a  culture  of
prohibition  and  first  steps  towards  an  “eco-dictatorship”  or  at  least  potentially
authoritarian.  Even  the  label  “eco-fascism”  turned  up  (as  it  does  reflexively  and
reliably whenever regulations are imminent).
9 In what follows, I will focus on those strands of ecological thinking which are at odds
with democracy,  either explicitly or implicitly,  since they reveal  the particular soft




10 Maybe the most prominent anti-democratic attribution to environmentalism is that of
purporting a “green” dictatorship or even fascism in the name of ecology. Facing the
failure  of  liberal  democracies  to  enforce  better  instruments  to  protect  the
environment,  calling  for  a  “strong  state”  may  be  a  continuous  (and  growing)
temptation.  In  order  to  protect  survival,  some  play  with  the  idea  of  a  rather
authoritarian  regime  which  acts  in  the  line  of  a  declared  state  of  emergency  and
controls public life, restricts fundamental rights and allots resources, if necessary by
force.4 I will elaborate on those actual tendencies later.
11 Yet  the  term  “eco-fascism”  transports  another,  even  more  severe  reproach:
environmentalism’s potential support of fascist/Nazi ideology (Zimmerman 2000; Ferry
1995).  This  applies  specially  to  approaches  that  hold  a  holistic  and rather  spiritual
attitude,  for  example  deep  ecology  or  other  rather  ecocentric  currents.  Critics  are
eager to point to and warn against their “dark side.” The claim of the affinity of holistic
environmentalism to fascist ideology mainly refers to the romantic and anti-modernist
attitudes often displayed in these approaches on the one hand and to the ecological
dimension of Nazism on the other hand.
12 Undeniably,  one  of  the  many  historic  origins  of  environmentalism  is  a  defensive
reaction  to  the  industrialization  and,  more  broadly,  modernization  (Radkau  2012:
254-60; Barry 2014: 155).  This line entails romantic and spiritual features,  like a re-
sacralization of nature, that may turn into an explicit anti-modernism and even anti-
rationalism. Despite the fact that there are some overlappings of green thinking and
right-wing extremism, a closer look reveals a rather weak link that is far from making a
point against environmentalist thinking, even in its holistic and spiritual variants.
13 First,  the  reproach  rests  on  a  simplified  idea  of  fascism  (Plumwood  2000:  70-6).
Moreover, the “green” side of Nazism is overstated. The “blood and soil”-ideology of
the Third Reich indeed drew on ideas of autarchy and subsistence and displayed a kind
of timely ecological awareness (“ökologische Geistesgegenwart,” Radkau 2012: 294). It
used the strong emotions of frustration prevalent in the German population and sought
to  channel  them  into  a  nationalist  love  for  the  homeland  and  its  landscape.
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Furthermore, certain anti-modernist and pagan elements surely played a role in Nazi
ideology.  Nevertheless,  it  also  was  progressivist  and  rather  relied  on  technology.
Natural resources were heavily exploited for armament. Autarchy was propagated in
order  to  prepare  the  war.  In  sum,  the  concrete  politics  of  the  Third  Reich  wasn’t
“greener” than the Weimar Republic (Radkau 2012: 260-73, 294-8).
14 Even  if  twentieth  century  fascism  could  be  taken  as  most  extreme  example  of
“ecological identity politics,” not any form of ecological thinking that underlines the
commitment and bonding to a specific place and/or community leads to exclusive – or
even  xenophobic  –  political  action.  Nevertheless,  ideas  of  “native”  landscape  and
untouched wilderness are dangerously close to that of purity and provide it  with a
“natural” grounding. Evoking strong affection for a particular environment bears the
danger  of  feeding also  reactionist  feelings.5 Then,  the  preservation  of  ecosystems
blends  with  the  preservation  of  one’s  own  community,  or  even  “race,”  and  the
protection of one’s homeland seems to suggest keeping out foreigners, be it invasive
animals or immigrants – both “do not belong.” Bioregionalism, or other movements
that strongly rest  on ecological  identity politics,  thus are in danger of  leading to a
“culture of  nature” that is  exclusive,  xenophobic,  and undemocratic.6 Though these
affinities must not be downplayed, charging environmentalism in general of fostering
“eco-fascism”  and  building  a  green  dictatorship  must  be  considered  an  attempt  of
discrediting  environmental  thinking  and,  most  important,  environmental  political
action.
15 Still, beyond those red herrings, there are actual and more pressing anti-democratic
tendencies  in  environmental  thinking.  In  what  follows,  I  will  highlight  three
problematic  aspects:  First,  a  certain  inherent  affinity  to  revolutionary  and  anarchist
thinking is pointed out. Second, I will take a closer look at different lines of paternalism
and  authoritarianism.  Third,  the  political  implications  of  the  widespread  non-
anthropocentric ideal are examined.
 
2.2. Bringing Down the System: Revolutionary Action
16 A first potentially anti-democratic feature may be found on the level of the mode of
political  action.  Generally,  radical  forms of  environmentalist  thinking tend to  have
sympathies for anarchism (Barry 2014: 158) and to be politically revolutionary instead of
relying on reforms. “Fixing” environmental problems while going on the way we used
to  seems  a  “shallow”  solution  –  which  means  it  is  no  solution  at  all.  From  this
perspective, we need a thoroughgoing social and cultural transformation. The crucial
question is how this demand for change is realized, and how far-reaching it is.
17 Deep ecology, for example, clearly advocates a radical re-orientation with regard to our
lifestyle. Though this implies fundamental political, economic and social changes, deep
ecologists remain rather vague about how these are to implement and focus on the
importance of an alternative philosophy. The revolution is intended to happen on the
metaphysical  level:  ontology  first,  politics  second.  “The  advocates  of  deep  ecology
claim that the most important task is to understand the world in the right way [my
italics];  given the correct understanding, the ethical choices will  be obvious.” (Katz,
Light & Rothengerg 2000: xiv).7 This openness leaves room for anti-democratic political
action yet  it  does  not  explicitly  support  it,  the  more  so  as  it  is  conceded that  the
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necessary deep change may be performed in small steps, and is only revolutionary “in
direction” (Naess 1989: 156).
18 The problematic dimension of revolutionary demands become obvious when not only
the  free  market  and  global  capitalism  are  identified  as  part  of  a  system  that  is
ecologically  disastrous  but  also  the  existing  institutional  and  political  structures,
including democracy. In contrast to reformist environmentalism, the criticism of “the
system” is totalized, hence the necessity of a system-change is claimed (Westra 1993:
126).
19 The  radical  movement  of  anarcho-primitivism  is  probably  the  most  significant
manifestation of that kind of criticism. According to its proponents, civilization itself is
the  root  of  our  social  and  environmental  problems,  since  it  has  alienated  us  from
ourselves and the environment. Apart from mediation and technology, what deprived
humans from “what’s real” and valuable is the “ideology of civilization,” which raised
false and perverted desires and must be fought in order to be authentic again. This
ideology is “based upon deep rooted notions of ‘progress,’ the value of consumption
and work, domestication and order, and the underlying desires created by industrial
society” (Humphrey 2007: 34). State, capital, organised religion, technology, in short:
civilization, is said to facilitate oppression, alienation, domestication and exploitation.
In  consequence,  it  has  to  be  abandoned  respectively  destroyed.  Furthermore,
primitivism rejects  politics  in  all  but  anarchic  forms and advocates  the  absence  of
political  authority  (Humphrey  2007:  31-9;  Aaltola  2010:  164-6).  The  revolutionary
impetus of anarcho-primitivism thus is not only anti-civilizatory, but anti-democratic
and finally anti-political at its core.
 
2.3. “What Must Be Done, Must Be Done!” – Green Authoritarianism
20 A second source  of  anti-democratic  sentiment  in  environmentalist  thinking  can  be
found  in  its  tendency  to  become  paternalistic  and  authoritarian.  Among
environmentalists,  there  is  a  widespread,  sometimes  even  hostile  skepticism  with
regard to the capacity of democratic governments to implement “green” politics, that
is, to do “what needs to be done” (Norton 2002: 22; Leist 2005: 441). In short, this feeds
into the wider narrative of the inability of democracies to solve complex problems –
which strongly undermines their legitimacy in terms of output: Democracies do not (or
at least, not any more) “deliver” (Leggewie & Welzer 2010: 137). This skeptic attitude is
fed  by  several,  often  intertwined  sources,  and  I  will  briefly  outline  the  two  most
popular  motifs:  the  assumptions  that  democratic  processes  are  too  slow,  and  that
citizens are neither competent enough nor willing to support more restrictive policies.
21 The first reservation is due to a “sense of urgency,” caused by the idea of an “imminent
environmental catastrophe” and “the belief that time [is] running out fast” (Humphrey
2007: 12). Eco-authoritarians, or “survivalists,” are convinced that democracy is just
not effective enough to achieve survival and hence must be dismissed.8
22 However,  the  believe  that  environmental  issues  are  tackled  too  little  and  too  late
within democratic societies prompts most environmentalists to search for means to
nudge them. Consequently, direct action is an essential part of ecological activism. Given
that the threat of ecological disaster is enormous, one may argue that a “do or die”-
attitude is more than fair and that resistance, including violence, is legitimate and even
demanded. Whereas critics deplore direct action as anti-democratic “eco-terrorism,”
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the vast  majority  of  green political  movements  and activists  see  themselves  in  the
tradition of non-violent civil disobedience (Humphrey 2007: 40-62). With the exception of
rather radical groups like Earth First!,9 the Animal Liberation Front or, recently, Extinction
Rebellion, the aim of “ecotage” is to enforce laws, yet even when illegal action is part of
the agenda and seen as legitimate means, non-violence against human beings remains a
central principle.10 Thus, direct action is a democratic response to the feeling of being
in a state of emergency and a way to come to terms with the inertia of democracy
without relying on authoritarian instruments.
23 Yet  the  alleged  inadequacy  of  democracy  is  not  only  a  matter  of  time.  The  “anti-
democratic  despair”  is  also  fed  by  “the  view  that  ordinary  citizens  are  politically
incompetent, especially at times of crisis” (Humphrey 2007: 11). This judgement rests
mainly on anthropological assumptions provided by rational choice theory. Democratic
decision making is regarded as a problem of collective action. From this perspective,
the environmental crisis thus confronts us with a planetary version of the tragedy of
the  commons.  When  left  to  individual  choices,  the  myopic  citizens  would  most
probably follow their self-interest instead of voting for more coercive laws or change
their behaviour. Even when a democratic value change is considered the improbable
but ideal solution, it would still be a long-term solution. That is why those laws, like
limitations on rights of property,  mobility,  and procreation, have to be imposed on
people by an elite that knows better (Humphrey 2007: 15-20; Westra 1998).  Platon’s
philosopher king returns in the guise of the “enlightened ecological elite” (Humphrey
2007: 25).11 
24 These two reasons for turning to authoritarian elitism mingle with another feature of
environmentalist  thinking  that  reveals  its  anti-democratic  potential  only  on  closer
inspection:  the idea of  evidence-based,  or rather:  evidence-determined,  action.  As a
political and social theory, environmentalism strongly draws on the natural sciences
(Barry 2014: 156), leading to a strong imperative character of green political theory. 
25 Though  this  reliance  is  an  important  reminder  that  environmental  issues  indeed
cannot be treated as mere questions of opinion, it also bears the danger of collapsing
politics into science. If how to address the ecological crises is considered to be “not just
a question of choice in a plural framework of values” (Vincent 2003: 182) and becomes a
matter of “doing the right thing” instead, the downright call for expertocracy seems to
be the best solution.
26 The idea of a strong, scientist-led state that is able to manage ecological problems is
supported  by  a  structural  argument  for  centralism,  presuming  that  large-scale
problems need large-scale institutions in order to be addressed successfully (Radcliffe
2002: 21-8).12 What is more, technology is an important part of this management by
scientific  experts.  Yet  the  belief  in  merely  technical  solutions  not  only  fails  to
acknowledge the necessity of a cultural transformation but also amounts to advancing
“non-political techno-fixes” (Barry 2014: 170; Oreskes & Conway 2012: 260-2). This is
true for the defenders of geo-engineering (some of them among the proponents of eco-
pragmatism)  but  also  for  a  widespread  Malthusian  thread  that  runs  through
environmentalist thinking (Radkau 2011: 158-61).13 Hence, such a techno-optimism or
techno-fideism,  whether  in  its  cornucopian  or  Malthusian  version  may  foster  the
general de-politization of a society. 
27 In the end, the idea that science provides privileged access to reality and/or epistemic
certainty  facilitates  sceptic  reservations  with  regard  to  democracies.  Under  the
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premises of such an epistemological elitism, it appears as if political action must follow
immediately from scientific findings. Yet grounding politics in seeing the world “in the
right  way”  is  a  problematic  naturalization  that  requires  a  rather  naïve  realism.14
Referring to an objective natural order and a resulting moral and political imperative
seems to be just another version of the naturalist fallacy, and I will later come back to
some  epistemic  caveats  that  might  well  brought  forward  from  the  pragmatist
perspective.
 
2.4. Overcoming Anthropocentrism: Other-Than-Humans and
Politics
28 A third potentially anti-democratic element comes along with an epistemic revolution
that  led  to  the  perhaps  most  divisive  line  in  environmental  philosophy:  that  of
anthropocentrism  vs.  non-anthropocentrism.  The  human-centered  approach  of
traditional  ethics  appeared to  be failing in addressing the ecological  problems that
became more and more obvious during the second half of the 20th century. Even more,
it  was  charged  to  come  with  a  “human  chauvinism”  that  led  to  exploitative  and
destructive  ecological  behaviour  in  the  first  place.  The  Christian  image  of  man  as
legitimate  ruler  over  God’s  creation  came  under  attack  for  being  the  original
foundation of such a harmful anthropocentrism that continued to be no less effective
in its secularized version (White 1967). With respect to its idea of human separateness
from and mastery over nature,  humanism is  often seen as  the heir  of  Christianity.
Moreover, teleological thinking converted into a belief in progress, especially one that
is driven by science and technology (Gray 2007).  Under these premises, the way we
relate to non-humans is nearly inevitably presumptuous and finally destructive.
29 If  the  human perspective  is  taken  to  be  the  primary  one  when it  comes  to  moral
considerations,  their needs and interests will  have priority over those of elephants,
palm trees, lakes, or the atmosphere – if they are conceded to have interests on their
own at all. Their integrity, health and flourishing are only a derivative to that of human
beings.  Their  value is  purely instrumental.  According to the critics  of  conventional
environmental philosophy, an alternative ethical rationale is needed in order to take
care of nature adequately – not only in terms of philosophical reasoning, but also in
terms of political action. The human being has to be de-centered, its central position
must  be overcome in order  to  tackle  environmental  problems (Routley 1973,  Naess
1989).15
30 Whether or not a fundamental change from anthropocentrism to bio- or ecocentrism is
actually helpful or even necessary for a successful policy change (that is, to a fossil free,
sustainable,  non-exploitive  global  economy)  must  be  discussed separately.16 Yet  the
theoretical implications of such a change must be carefully examined with regard to
the political level, since there may be some obnoxious consequences when we leave the
familiar terrain of the anthropocentric rationale.
31 Our  traditional  Western  understanding  of  what  moral  and  political  agents  are  is
seriously challenged by the imperative to assign moral rights to non-humans, and not
only  those  who are  beyond  the  species-line  but  even  to  non-sentient  beings  and
entities. The great majority of political theories define the democratic community, that
is,  the  community  of  those  we  have  to  concern  and  are  obliged  to,  as  a  human
community.  Rights  are  individual  human  rights.  Non-anthropocentrists  demand  to
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reinvent  politics  and expand this  community.  We need to  discuss  who/what  is  the
political subject, when it is no longer human beings alone, and gain a more inclusive
understanding  of  the  public.  How  shall  we  structure  the  political  institutionally?
(Cudworth & Hobden: 154-62).17
32 Apart from the question if the concepts provided by political theory so far endure this
expansion,  a  maximum  inclusion  leads  to  conflicts  of  a  new  kind.18 A  holistic
ecocentrism  concedes  nature,  or,  more  precisely,  ecosystems,  a  value  on  its  own,
independent from its indirect value as a life-supportive function for human beings.
Whereas anthropocentrism clearly favours human interests, non-anthropocentrism has
to  balance  interests  and  values.  Even  more  if  it  argues  for  a  “biospherical
egalitarianism,” according to which “everything has the equal right to subsist” (Vincent
2003: 189) and “all natural beings and entities are intertwined, and need to be taken
equally into account” (Aaltola 2010: 161).
33 In  the  case  of  more radical  ecocentric  approaches,  the  ecosystem becomes morally
primary (Westra 1993: 125). The ultimate consequence can be made clear by employing
a variant of Richard Routley’s “last man” scenario (Routley 1973). It was designed to
show the ultimate implication of anthropocentric ethics in a rather drastic way: The
last human survivor on earth would be morally right (or at least: not wrong) if he/she
would decide to destroy any living being left and make extinction complete. Turning
the table, it would be morally right (or even a moral obligation) to reduce the human
population drastically if it was clear that the ecosystem would break down otherwise.19
Taking  the  maintenance  of  the  ecosystem  as  highest  priority  and  pleading  for  an
“environmental triage” entails, as Westra concedes, “adopting a ruthless ‘bottom line’
mentality” and the “downgrading of all other social causes/obligations if a conflict with
survival were present” (Westra 1993: 134).
34 That  is,  approaches  that  give  primacy  to  non-human  higher  goods,  be  it  nature,
biodiversity, or the stability of ecosystems, potentially subordinate individual rights as
well as rights of nation states respectively national governments (Westra 1993: 128-32).
Our understanding of democracy is seriously challenged by that shift.
 
3. Towards an Ecological Democracy
35 The  examination  of  those  elements  of  environmentalist  thinking  which  question
democracy  may  have  left  the  convinced  democrat  as  well  as  the  engaged
environmentalist perplexed and faced with a seemingly dilemma. Do we have to give up
either democratic or environmental ideals? In what follows, I would like to argue that
the case is far from settled. As we have seen, there are approaches of environmentalism
that are not only sceptical but hostile towards democracy. Still, the actual (historic as
well  as  contemporary)  fascist  or  anarcho-primitivist  currents  must  not  be taken as
obstructions against a democratic environmentalism in principle. The same is true for
the anti-democratic features in other variants of environmentalism. Neither do they
necessarily result in or even demand a downright green dictatorship, let alone a fascist
regime. Even more, we can learn from their sometimes radical critique and the points
of fractures that become visible through them.
36 The other way round, it would be appealing but simply misleading to assume a direct
link between (liberal) democracy and green values: “For greens to somehow show that
all democrats must join them in order to be democrats seems too good to be true.”
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(Humphrey 2007: 83). The “argument from precondition” (Dryzek 1987) that suggests
that an intact ecosphere is as much a precondition for democracy as free speech, is all
too generalisable and applies to all forms of government – and finally to every human
activity: “It is nor more or less than an anthropocentric argument for sustainability, as
is as much a precondition for business, sport, scholarship, and tiddlywinks as it is [for]
democratic politics.” (Humphrey 2007: 84-5). The argument, thus, is one-directional: it
gives good reason for democrats (and any human being) to support green politics but is
no argument for greens to be democrats.
37 With  regard  to  the  argument  from  precondition,  democratic  and  authoritarian
governments seem to be on a par. However, looking at the chances of authoritarian
regimes  to  eventually  realize  green  politics,  some  serious  objections  emerge.
Notwithstanding the dubious idea of  a  “good” (which means,  in this  case,  “green”)
autocrat who uses the given mandate in the way hoped for and only in that way, the
assertiveness of such power rule is mainly overestimated. What is often neglected in
the debate, especially by the proponents of “green dictatorship,” is how unlikely it is
that  an  authoritarian  regime  is  able  to  permanently  impose  restrictive  policies  on
unwilling  people.  Ecological  politics  need  the  support  and  cooperation  of  the
population. Transformation works best if it is not only accepted but understood as a
common project (Barry 2002: 147; Buchstein 2012: 54-6; Pötter 2010: 27-8; Leggewie &
Welzer 2010: 135).20 
38 In the end, the situation is less dilemmatic (which also means: more complicated) than
activists  and  lobbyists  on  both  sides  proclaim.  At  the  same  time,  the  relation  of
democracy and environmentalism remains precarious. We have to concede that there
is no set relationship,  no guaranteed connection between democratic processes and
environmental-friendly  outcomes,  since  deliberative  procedures  are  contingent  and
uncertain: “Democracy was only ever a tool for the people to express their will. It never
determined  that  will.”  (Mulgan  2011:  220;  Goodin  1992:  168;  Minteer  2005:  56).
Therefore,  in  order  to  strive  towards  an  ecological  democracy,  it  is  all  the  more
important  to  ask  what  fosters  democratization,  what  preconditions  does  a  lively
democratic society rest on? 
39 One important lesson we can learn from the vigorous critique of democracy brought
forward  by  rather  radical  environmental  approaches  is  that  actual  existing
democracies have large blind spots and deformations. Majority choices and political
preferences  among citizens  seem to  be  more  or  less  ignorant  towards  the  massive
ecological disaster the “modern” way of life causes and that will change the world as
we know it – and probably for much worse. Thus, the idea that it is a particular lifestyle
that is deeply flawed and must be overcome points to the heart of the problem in a
manner of fact. 
40 Though  anarcho-primitivism  may  well  be  criticized  for  being  naïve  and  romantic
(Aaltola 2010: 175-9), it can provide a mode of critical thinking that seems to be needed
in  order  to  achieve  fundamental  change:  “It  is  not  (normally)  that  proponents  of
primitivism wish to literally drag human society back to paleolithic forms of life, minus
all forms of modern technology. Rather they want people to think outside of a whole
set of deeply socialised prejudices and assumptions, and understand how many of the
ideas and institutions that ‘we’ value are actually subtle facilitators of oppression and
domestication.”  (Humphrey  2007:  39).  By  challenging  the  habitual  ideas  of  what  is
“normal,” anarcho-primitivism may encourage to pose the question of the good life
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again and find alternative answers.  Furthermore,  and especially  with regard to the
authoritarian  and  anti-liberal  tendencies  in  other  currents  of  environmentalist
thinking, the anarchic elements may well be seen as a counterbalance and putting an
“emphasis on collectivism, individual freedom and self-fulfilment” (Aaltola 2010: 161).
41 Another focus must, of course, be on the deliberative processes of democratic societies.
I  would  like  to  suggest  that  before  we  dismiss  democracies  as  unable  to  respond
properly  to  the  ecological  crisis,  we  could  consider  their  failure  in  setting  up  an
adequate  environmental  agenda  not  as  due  to  their  being  “too  democratic,”  but
because of their being not democratic enough. The public discourse and its conditions
can  be  conceived  to  be  the  focal  point  of  environmentalist  reservations  against
democracy.  Thus,  my  outline  of  an  ecological  democracy  aligns  to  the  following
questions: How is the public opinion formed, what drives the deliberative processes?
Who gets heard und how do we speak?
 
3.1. Why Democratic Discourse Matters: Problem-Solving and
Participation
42 As  we  have  seen,  the  call  for  an  expertocracy  is  one  expression  of  the  belief  that
democratic  procedures  are not  efficient.  Critics  point  to  the  problem  of  the
“uneducated  voter,”  whose  myopic  choices  are  even  more  promoted  under  the
conditions of economically framed ideas of the good life. Second, there is the problem
of economic national and, above all, corporate interests. If the deliberative processes of
policy-making and decision-making are driven (one could even say distorted) by these
two factors, democratic votes tend to be rather populist votes and indeed “inimical to
environmental values” (Westra 1993: 129-30). 
43 These two factors are inextricable, since political and economic lobbyists exert massive
influence on public processes of opinion making. Especially the proponents of a “free
market fundamentalism” seek to undermine trust in scientific findings and thereby
discredit  calls  for  environmental  regulations  as  alarmist  and anti-liberal  (Oreske  &
Conway 2012). The public debate is shaped by groups with an ideological agenda.21
44 Against the elitist and authoritarian temptation of an efficient government of experts,
philosophical pragmatism provides an understanding of inquiry – and science as a most
professionalized  mode  of  that  general  human activity  –  that  comes  with  epistemic
humility and a fallibilist caveat. Hence, pragmatists are generally modest with regard
to the “correct way of seeing things” and abstain from epistemological elitism: neither
scientists  nor  other  experts  are  empowered  to  claim  privileged  access  to  reality.
Science cannot tell us how things “really are” – and it cannot dictate political decisions.
Though  pragmatism  certainly  calls  for  giving  weight  to  scientific  experts  in
deliberative  processes,  it  doesn’t  demand  (or  even  allow  for)  a  “scientification”  of
politics.  Even  more,  declaring  political  decisions  as  unavoidable  with  reference  to
science would be revealed as an untenable move of sheer power.22 
45 Nevertheless, rejecting any “paternalism of science” does not legitimize to endlessly
cast  doubt  on  scientific  findings  in  order  to  prevent  action  in  their  line.
“Environmental agnosticism,” the choice to wait for ultimate certainty and therefore to
remain inactive, is also an action (Kitcher & Keller 2017: 23-4) – and a harmful one.
Following  the  environmental  activist’s  claim  “Listen  to  the  science”  on  pragmatic
grounds would therefore lead to giving experts an advisory role, taking their findings
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seriously, and figure out “what has to be done” in a corporate and democratic process.23
That  is,  with  regard  to  the  environmental  challenge,  the  issue  of  scientific  literacy
becomes crucial.24
46 Another benefit of endorsing a pragmatist perspective is an understanding of public
discourse and opinion-making alternative to liberal as well as authoritarian concepts.
Though it seems clear that the public plays a crucial legitimatory role for successful
politics,  the  non-anthropocentric  bias  in  environmental  philosophy  leads  to  a  vast
omission of the idea of public interest in favor of nature’s interest. Part of this neglect
stems from the assumption that the public interest is the sum of individual preference,
which  amounts  to  the  conviction  that  “environmental  protection  is  […]  effectively
being held hostage to the preponderance of exogenous and unquestionable consumer
demand values” (Minteer 2005: 41).
47 Indeed,  if  democratic  decision-making  is  reduced  to  the  aggregation  of  individual
preferences in terms of the homo oeconomicus,  we are left to devices as cost-benefit-
analyses. Yet purely economic valuation of the environment is highly problematic as
underlying rationale.25
48 Against this liberal,  individualist  model of  public  interest, the ideal  of  the common
good has been suggested. Yet this alternative becomes problematic when an objective
metaphysical understanding is endorsed: the public can not only be mistaken about it
interests, but also be overruled by those who claim to have identified it. The common
good, then, becomes an instrument for elitist and authoritarian policies (Minteer 2005:
39-43).26
49 The pragmatist,  Deweyan concept  avoids  the problems of  the liberal  idea of  public
interest as well as the potentially authoritarian notion of the common good, since it is
understood as constructed in the ever-transforming situational context of a community
that organizes itself in order to solve shared problems. What is regarded the common
good  is  a  provisional  result  of  an  open  process  of  deliberation  and  cannot  be  set
externally (Minteer 2005: 44-50).
50 Nevertheless, the public is far from idealized. Dewey is well aware of the “eclipse” of
the public and its inchoate status (Dewey 1991). Considering the crucial role that is
given to the public and public discourse, there are several desiderata. Generally, the
actual  conditions  of  the  deliberative  process must  be  paid  attention  to  and  constantly
improved.27 Thus,  fighting  inequality,  marginalization  and  discrimination  is  a
mandatory  part  of  democratization  –  and  should  also  be  part of  environmental
engagement.  Furthermore,  the  pluralization  of  the  discourse  has  to  be  fostered,
especially with regard to dissenting voices.28 Beyond providing the framework for the
best possible public discourse, it is important to highlight the role of the attitude hold
by its participants. Against the view of a consumerist, myopic and egotistic individual
that will attempt to enforce its particular interests, the pragmatist demands a lot (and
assumes the ability of citizens to meet that demands): willingness to change one’s mind
during the deliberative process, listening to alien demands and broadening one’s own
interest (Minteer 2005: 46). 
51 In a nutshell, philosophical pragmatism supports the idea that democratic deliberation
is the best way of addressing the global environmental challenge. If  we understand
environmental problems as highly complex political problems that require a high level
of  creative  and  cooperative  problem-solving  as  well  as  the  best  possible  results  of
decision-making, we need not only the broadest possible community of inquirers, but
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also  the  integrative  and  transformative  function  of  democracy  (see,  for  example,
Dryzek 1987). Thus, over and above giving a very basic epistemological argument in
favor  of  democracy,  the  intrinsic  value  of  public  discourse  is  highlighted:  beyond
contributing to solving a problem, it is the very fact that people can have their say,
engage in a common project and build a community, that makes it desirable. 
52 The mere experience of being part of the process, in contrast to achieving a certain
outcome, is a good in itself, as it is able to induce the feeling of self-efficacy and thereby
counteracts  political  apathy.  Hence,  participation is  not alone  a  vehicle  for  getting
“better results,”  but increasing it  is  to be named as a  crucial  dimension of  “more”
democracy (Leggewie & Welzer 2010: 149; 172-3).
53 On the one hand, this has implications on the institutional level: means like mediation,
citizen  forums,  referendums  and  initiatives  have  to  be  implemented  in  order  to
encourage  and  enable  participation  (Smith  2003:  77-102).  Yet  active  citizen
participation is not only a question of “formal” democracy, but of a “personal” one, of
democracy  as  a  way of  life.  It  supports  the  development  of  democratic  habits,  the
experience of self-governance and building a democratic “spirit” that is necessary to
resist  antidemocratic  forces  and  foster  institutional  democratization.  Thus,
participation is essential for deepening democracy: individual potentials are released
and cooperations can be forged – which leads not only to a better handling of problems
but  also  changes  the  community  culture  which in  turn may have  effects  beyond a
particular  community  (Green  1998:  232-41,  247-9).  Local  participation  builds
democratic  citizen  skills  and  has  translocal  implications:  acting  locally  enables
ambitious global transformations (Green 1998: 227; Light 2002: 170). 
54 Yet the acceptance, and more: the active endorsement of environmental policies rests
not only on taking part in the deliberative processes. What is also needed is a feeling of
environmental  responsibility,  a  “sense  of  stewardship”  (Light  2002:  157). In  other
words: people need to care about their environment. The most urgent question thus
may be how to make environmental  questions a matter  of  concern for  citizens.  Why
should  people  care  about  such  an  abstract  thing  as  nature?  Providing  facts  and
information is an important part of creating responsibility, but not sufficient. Rather, it
takes “a bond of  interest  between local  communities and the nature around them”
(Light 2002: 158). Engaging in a participatory relationship with nature, for example by
way  of  local  environmental  projects,  prevents  potential  free-riders  and  creates  an
intrinsic motivation in citizens.29 Aiming at such a democratic “ecological citizenship”
(Light 2002) thus is confronted with “the new problem of dirty hands” (Light 2002: 168):
the challenge to get more people involved in direct environmental practices.
 
3.2. Who Gets Heard? Broadening the Conversation
55 Besides the condition of public discourse, its scope must be reconsidered. If we need “a 
gigantic conversation” (Kitcher & Keller 2017: 84), who is part of the ideal community?
Following the idea of a “democracy of the affected” (Eckersley 2000), the synchronic as
well as the diachronic axis will have to be prolonged. 
56 Given that current environmental policies have a huge impact on future generations,
we  need  to  question  democratic  decisions  and  practices  with  regard  to
intergenerational justice. In a way, democratic procedures disfavour future interests:
they neither  have a  vote  nor  are  they represented.  The systemic  neglection of  the
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future becomes manifest in the focus on the next election and the unwillingness to
consider a sustainable economic policy. In addition, the practice of discounting future
costs  and  benefits  shows  a  strong  bias  for  present  people.  Relying  on  the  moral
commitment to following generations obviously proved not sufficient, and especially
the idea that each generation will turn out better than the last, that is, the belief in
endless  growth,  turned  out  at  least  dubious.  Not  only  does  the  current  decisions
decrease future options, they even create irreversible facts and constraints of action
(Mulgan  2011:  212-20;  Leggewie  &  Welzer  2010:  157-9,  224).  If  reversibility  is
understood as a central feature of democratic decisions, present environmental and
economic policies are deeply undemocratic. 
57 Furthermore,  broadening  the  conversation  means  to  make  the  public  discourse  as
inclusive as possible. Westra articulates the need to “speak out on global issues beyond
the  reach  of  democracy  or  other  political  systems  within  which  they  reside,”  and
demands an “enlightened public” that consists of “educated and aware cosmic citizens”
(Westra 1993: 135). Though actual discourse is always restricted by time and space, the
question who is to include emerges with new urgency when it comes to environmental
issues, and non-anthropocentric approaches remind us of that.
58 When it comes to voting for environmental policies, adapting Rawls could provide an
imaginary means to consider more interests and arrive at fairer decisions: behind an
extended global  veil  of  ignorance,  the  voters  have  to  imagine  themselves  not  only
ignorant of their race and gender, their social, national and historic position, but also
of their species (Westra 1993: 135; Mulgan 2011: 173-84; Gottlieb 2019: 86).
59 Still,  if  we are to build a democratic ecological  community,  the question of  how to
expand the range of whom we consider our fellow-beings remains crucial.  Whether
pure representation and compassion is enough for this cause, or if we need role-taking
or even identification (Naess 1989: 171-6), and if this a possible move at all without
being  chauvinist again  is  highly  debated.  How  can  we  achieve  solidarity  without
colonizing other-than-humans? Environmental philosophy could learn from feminist
and anti-colonial theory here and adopt an idea of the other that includes sensitivity
for  otherness  and  difference  and  at  the  same  time  abstains  from  dualistic
“hyperseparation” (Plumwood 2000: 61-70). Inspired by difference theory with regard
to minorities and marginalized groups,30 consulting future generations and non-human
nature  could  be  an  important  step  to  “greening  representative  assemblies”  (Smith
2003: 111-24). So, extending the moral community beyond the human community and
thereby “greening” the state may well move it beyond the liberal model.31 
60 Another dimension of broadening the discourse and renegotiating who gets heard is
marked by the question how to deliberate. Against the idea of a purely rational reasoning
that is led by universal principles and logical conclusions, deliberation may also include
emotions  and  narrative  elements.  Given  that  participants  are  not  distanced  and
indifferent  with  regard  to  the  subject  of  the  conversation,  telling  the  full  story  is
crucial for achieving a reciprocal understanding of adversary positions: “Expressions of
anger, grief, fear, confusion, joy, and gratitude are not distractions from a democratic
deliberation, but an essential part. They give us insight into why something may be
crucially important to us or our fellows.” (Gottlieb 2019: 64). We need to know what
drives other persons, what matters to them, in order to develop empathy and solidarity
despite the differences. The enrichment of communicative styles beyond the rational
(and perhaps even the verbal) mode may also facilitate the extension of democratic
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deliberation  beyond  humans:  “In  this  admittedly  expanded  sense  of  democratic
conversation, we might encounter, for instance, the melting of glaciers due to global
warming, the rash of pollution-caused birth abnormalities in frogs, or the emotional
devastation  of  animals  kept  in  zoos.  We  might  encounter,  that  is,  an  ecological
democracy.” (Gottlieb 2019: 66). This ecological democracy relies on the human ability to
form a bond without verbal communication, though knowledge continues to play an
important  role  for  “listening”  to  non-human  nature.  That  is,  being  part  of  that
ecological democracy requires “that we learn to pay attention to what nature is saying
to us: both by awareness of reasonably accessible scientific knowledge and by a process
of attunement to plants, animals, and ecosystems” (Gottlieb 2019: 73-4).32
61 Whereas a blunt biospherical egalitarianism challenges the conventional architecture
of democracies, a “weak anthropocentrism” could be a viable option and is fully in line
with the pragmatic tradition (Norton 1984). The problems of non-human agency and
political representation that come with a full-blown shift to an ecocentric perspective
(Cudworth & Hobden 2011: 150-4) can be evaded by such a position: “We will continue
to eat, use, and compete with nature, trampling on insects or uprooting plants in ways
that would not be morally acceptable if done to people.” (Gottlieb 2019: 71-7).
62 Still,  such  an  “environmentally  enlightened  anthropocentrism”  (Smith  2003:  13)
involves at least the recognition of the instrumental value of non-human nature. We
are dependent on environmental conditions: Not only are they life-supporting, nature
also has a value for our identity and well-being, and acknowledging this can be a strong
rationale for the protection the environment (Smith 2003: 13-7).33 
63 Though pragmatist  thinking does not preclude a more fundamental de-centering of
human beings and has indeed sympathies for these more radical perspectives, a weak,
non-chauvinist  anthropocentrism  may  be  a  fit  starting  position  for  environmental
pragmatism. It takes up the legitimate criticism of post-humanist approaches, is aware
of the human embeddedness in nature, compassionate to fellow beings and sensitive to
the interrelations of humans and non-humans (Honnacker 2020: 79-81).
 
3.3. Conclusion: Ecological Meliorism
64 The question of how much time is left for effective collective action and a fundamental
change of policy continues to be central in the environmentalist debate and grows even
more acute. Looking back at more than fifty years of warnings and appeals, and facing
horrific  news  about  global  warming  like  extreme  weather  phenomena  or  quickly
melting poles and permafrost, it is increasingly difficult to trust in the ability of human
societies,  whether  democratic  or  not,  to  undergo  a  real  transformation.  Among
environmentalists,  there is a “sense of growing doom and frustration at the lack of
progress and social mobilization, or institutional planning, for the transition to a low-
carbon  or  post-carbon  society  and  economy”  (Barry  2014:  166).34 The  latest
philosophical proposals are no longer advocating a deep, but a dark ecology (Morton
2018).
65 Drawing on the  Jamesian notion of  meliorism,  I  suggest  an outlook that  is  neither
optimist nor pessimist with regard to the outcome of the ecological crisis.  Whereas
optimism may lead to inaction or promethean anti-politics, pessimism may result in an
anti-humanist nihilism, an “all is lost” attitude and a dismissal of all transformational
efforts. Both options, though, seem to lead to inhumane consequences, and “at times it
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is hard to know which is the more unsettling: the cosy and comforting accounts of
reformist ‘optimists’ […] or the shocking and frightening views of radical ‘pessimists’”
(Barry 2014: 170). Meliorism, in contrast, is an existential commitment that comes with
an in-built “call to action” – and this call relies not on complete certainty or evidence
but operates into the unknown: the limited human capacity of determining “what has
to be done” is fully acknowledged.
66 Speaking  very  generally,  pragmatism  follows  a  negativist  account  in  terms  of
methodology.  Instead  of starting  with  a  definite  positive  ideal,  the  focus  is  on
disturbances, disfunctions and failures, that is, on problematic situations that has to be
solved, overcome, or changed to the better. The underlying minimal rationale thus is
preventing  harm.35 Such  a  negativist  account  of  green  politics  obviates  all  too
authoritarian prescriptions, since it does without pre-fixed solutions or goals or even a
definition of the “good life.” Rather, it strives for provisional and dynamic solutions by
tackling concrete harmful and exploitive structures that hinder well-being. In order to
identify relevant problems, these structures have to be made visible, they need a “de-
sequestering” (Barry 2014: 165). Looking for concrete deficits and ecologically harmful
practices,  for  example  with  regard  to  CO2-emitters  or  unsustainable  chains  of
production,  may  lead  to  better  procedures  than  rather  abstract  discussions  about
future sustainability.36
67 What is more, the thoroughgoing pragmatic pluralism may be helpful to overcome a
serious  hindrance  to  environmental  action.  Not  only  with  regard  to  strategies
(conservation  vs.  preservation),  or  priorities  (wind  power  vs.  nuclear  power,  wind
power vs. bird protection), but also to the very grounding of environmental reasoning,
we find conflicting views that have to be reconciled: “Value conflict is at the heart of
environmental politics.” (Smith 2003: 1). Instead of demanding “ethical monism, the
belief that there is a single, comprehensive and systematic theory that will eliminate
indeterminacy and value conflict” (Smith 2003: 18; 18-21), accepting value pluralism
could be fostering common action even in the case of conflicting ethical judgements
and indeterminate reasoning. This means to accept the potential incompatibility and
incommensurability of values: there are situations in which values exclude each other’s
fulfilment and there might be even no common ground on how to evaluate this conflict
(Smith 2003: 18-26). Hence, ecological meliorism is sensitive to the conflicting interests
in the public discourse that need to be addressed and reconciled – which can be said to
be the tragic core of the democratic project.37 Beyond the political arena, its sense for
the tragic is able to cope with the loss of ways of life and the pain transformational
processes can effect (an issue that is  often overlooked in environmental  discourse):
“Letting go” and stopping familiar practices may be the real challenge (Barry 2014:
166).
68 Though ecological meliorism aims at transformational action with all human effort, it
abstains from progressivist thinking. As little as humanity can rely on an intervening
God  to  save  the  world,  it  should  rely  on  a  future  technological  panacea.  Rather,
ecological  meliorism  rises  awareness  of  the  human  contingency:  Following  an
important  insight  from  non-anthropocentric  environmentalism,  it  gears  towards
overcoming human chauvinism and promethean thinking and adheres to a sense for
the vulnerability and dependence of human beings. Meliorist action thus involves a
particular, motivating kind of hope: “It is important to say what hope is not: it is not
the belief  that  everything was,  is,  or  will  be  fine.  The evidence is  all  around us  of
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tremendous suffering and tremendous destruction. […] It’s also not a sunny everything-
is-getting-better narrative, though it may be a counter to the everything-is-getting-
worse narrative. You could call it an account of complexities and uncertainties, with
openings.” (Solnit 2016: xi-xii).38 
69 It is not “too late” to perform social, economic and cultural transformations – though
the ecological crisis cannot be prevented anymore. It is already happening. Still,  we
have all reason (and the responsibility) to strive for the least harmful scenario. There is
so much left to lose and to fight for. Deepening democracy and endorsing ecological
meliorism will support that struggle. 
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NOTES
1. See Pötter (2010: 77) – although in my experience these kinds of statements, often uttered on
the sidelines of environmentalist’s meetings, are far from full-blown authoritarian fantasies. 
2. Interview  with  Der  Spiegel,  13.09.2019  (https://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/technik/
extinction-rebellion-gruender-roger-hallam-wenn-eine-gesellschaft-so-unmoralisch-handelt-
wird-demokratie-irrelevant-a-1286561.html), my translation. Hallam was arrested soon after the
interview  for  trying  to  disrupt  air  traffic  with  a  drone  at  Heathrow  Airport.  After  several
controversial statements on the Holocaust, XR Germany distanced itself from Hallam. 
3. One of the three declared aims of XR is a leading political role for citizens’ assemblies, see This
Is Not a Drill: An Extinction Rebellion Handbook (2019), London, Penguin Books.
4. See Pötter (2010: 23).
5. Even more, it  is only plausibly that these emotional commitments are instrumentalized in
order to give right-wing positions a friendly face and make them more accessible. One of the
most influential works of nature writing, “Tarka the Otter,” published on 1927, was written by
Henry  Williamson  who  supported  the  British  fascists.  For  a  more  detailed  critique  of  this
“ethnography” of the (new) nature writing see chapter IV in Kennedy (2018).
6. A more detailed critique of environmental activism that rests on ecological identity politics is
given in Light (2002: 158-65).
7. Postulating that “certain types of politics or morality are natural  in themselves” (Vincent
2003: 189) comes with possibly uncomfortable political consequences: “it is not at all clear why
authoritarian, tribal, or many other types of political community cannot be natural.” (Ibid. 191).
8. The survivalist strand reached its peak in the 1970ies, then mainly addressing the problem of
limited resources, and later shifted to ecocentrist view, see Humphrey (2007: 5).
9. Who actually  named  their  magazine  “Do  or  Die”  (1992-2003)  and  follow  the  slogan “No
Compromise in Defense of Mother Earth!”.
10. On the surprisingly small role of violence in the green movement see Radkau (2011: 409-95)
and Gottlieb (2019: 182-6). For a further discussion of the status of direct action see Humphrey
(2007: 63-77).
Environmentalism and Democracy
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-2 | 2020
19
11. For a detailed discussion of this anti-democratic epistemological elitism in Westra’s work see
Norton (2002: 23-6).
12. For a discussion of centralism vs. decentralism in environmental politics see Radcliffe (2002:
21-45).
13. Mostly, it remains unclear how the global population is to be diminished. Whereas using a
“social  technology”  like  raising  the  average  educational  level,  especially  for  women  seems
unproblematic and even in line with other goals like self-determination, other methods could
easily come close to eugenic considerations. Assuming that it will happen “naturally” (by disease,
or more and more inimical environmental conditions, and/or the wars that will be induced by
the fight for resources) may save from putting it on the political agenda yet is not less cynical
and anti-humanist, take for example Lovelocks “vision of a technological ‘survivalist’ society […]
a techno-optimistic  progressive society that is  at  one and the same time socially regressive”
(Barry 2014: 170).
14. Deep ecology, for example, as well as primitivism, employ such an anti-constructivist realism
(Aaltola 2010: 168-9). 
15. For an overview of non-anthropocentrism in environmental philosophy see Minteer (2009:
3-8), for the debate anthropocentrism vs. non-anthropocentrism see Smith (2003: 8-13).
16. Beyond holding it to be more plausible, another reason for defending the anthropocentric
outlook is finding it to be more promising with respect to efficiency. Yet one could as well argue
that on the level of political goals, both positions converge (Norton 1991; Minteer 2009: 8-13).
17. An interesting attempt of adapting legal terminology and including traditional knowlegde of
ecosystems and the relation of humans and non-humans is made in the Bolivian and Ecuadorian
law, which grants rights to pachamama, a concept stemming from indigenious cosmology (Horn &
Bergthaller 2019: 108-13).
18. See, for example, Gottlieb (2019: 41-3).
19. A complete reversal of the scenario would allow for getting rid of mankind in total. However,
apart from extreme cases like the Unabomber, whose anti-civilizatory ideal of nature without
humankind led him to acts of terrorism, extremely misanthropic positions, such as the idea of
humankind  as  a  planetary  disease  that  has  to  be  cured,  are  rarely  seriously  advocated  in
environmental  philosophy  or  influential  in  political  activism.  Even  the  explicit  antinatalism
inspired by deep ecology that can be found in the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement demands
only  critical  reflection  on  procreation,  and  Westra  and  most  other  proponents  of  holistic
environmentalism take “survival” for the primary value. Leist makes the priority of human life
precondition for an ecological democratic community (Leist 2005: 440-1). 
20. Comparing actual performances of democratic and autocratic regimes in terms of addressing
environmental  problems,  democracies  outmatch  autocracies  (Buchstein  2012:  56-8,  see  also
Jänicke 1996).
21. The capitalist framework of political actions is often identified as one of the major problems,
see for example Cudworth & Hobden (2011: 118-25).
22. A political strategy Bruno Latour tellingly denotes as “smuggling” (Latour 2015: 137, see also
21-30; Latour 1995: 22-67). For an earlier discussion of technocratic or decionist models which
tend to undermine democracy and the pragmatic concept of a critical mutual relation of science
and politics as an alternative see Habermas (1968).
23. Still,  the  willingness  to  sacrifice  democratic  values  in  order  to  strive  for  an  assumed
(scientific) necessity is not completely alien to pragmatism. F.C.S. Schiller’s support of fascism
was mainly motivated by his belief in its capabilities of building a “eugenic state,” whereas he
considered democracies incapable of doing what he identified as necessary to create a better, or
at least not declining, society (Honnacker 2018: 152-4). Also Peirce and, partly, James displayed
an  understanding  of  their  philosophy  analogous  to  positivistic  science  –  a  scientistic  self-
misconception, as Michael Hampe shows, see Hampe (2008).
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24. Following Dewey, Philip Kitcher highlights the role of science communication/education and
a “well-ordered science” for a democratic society, see, for example, Kitcher (2011: 169-92).
25. See Smith (2003: 29-50), Leist (2005: 493-7).
26. For example, according to Westra, we have to live up to the “integrity principle,” if necessary
by force (Westra 1993).
27. Habermasian discourse ethics and his concept of the public sphere that is marked by open
access, participatory parity and social equality may be a starting point here, see, for example,
Habermas (1988). For a critical extrapolation see, for example, Fraser (1992).
28. For  example,  José  Medina’s  “guerilla  pluralism” provides  a  fruitful  concept  for  radically
plural collective learning processes, see Medina (2015).
29. For the role of active interaction and concretion in learning see Dewey (2002). The role of
experience  and  emotional  bonding  for  developing  an  ethical  relationship  to  nature  is  also
highlighted in Aldo Leopold’s land ethics, see Leopold (1949).
30. Following, for example, the works of Iris Marion Young. 
31. The  Rawlsian  deliberative  model  of  liberal  democracy  may  also  prove  too  narrow,  for
example, with regard to disruptive environmentalist strategies and the burden public reasoning
puts on dissenting groups (Humphrey 2007: 98-101, 115-38). Robyn Eckersley’s “critical political
ecology” for example demands for a post-liberal democratic state (Eckersley 2004).
32. See Gottlieb (2019: 62-6, 71-7). Gottlieb points to the basic human ability of response-ability
beyond  the  verbal:  “If  we  can  respond  politically  to  babies  crying  from  hunger,  so  we  can
respond to poisoned fish and coral bleached white.” (Ibid.: 77)
33. Historically,  the  most  effective  motivation  for  acting  against  harmful  environmental
practices has been health concerns. Whether in the case of DDT, CFC or nuclear energy, the fear
of health-damaging effects, prominently cancer, led to massive public protests and change of
policies, see Radkau (2011: 405-8), and Radkau (2012: 16-7, 299-305).
34. Similarly Gottlieb (2019: 185-6): “We face a series of critical, often lethal, and for a good deal
of humanity perhaps even existential threats. […] It is not surprising that ‘feeling overwhelmed’
is a common condition among environmentalists.”
35. The  “maximal”  (rather  affirmative)  version  of  this  negative  rationale  is  the  ideal  of
flourishing which can also be found in the pragmatist tradition. Though the ideal of flourishing
in itself may be abused when it is substantially spelled out and fixed to a particular meaning
(Barry 2014: 162-3), the pluralist pragmatist articulation of flourishing is less determinate and
thus less vulnerable to authoritarian highjacking.
36. John Barry suggests a “politics of actually existing unsustainability,” analogous to the idea
that  starting  political  action  from  injustice  rather  than  from  a  theory  of  justice  is  more
promising, see Barry (2014: 159-65).
37. For a thoroughgoing study of the tragic in pragmatism see Hook (1974).
38. This idea of hope also underlines the plasticity of the world which is central to the meliorist
attitude: “Hope is an embrace of the unknown and the unknowable, […] the belief that what we
do matters.” (Solnit 2016: xii).
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ABSTRACTS
As the ecological  crisis  becomes increasingly  pressing,  the relation of  environmentalism and
democracy is spotlighted with new instancy. On one hand, the capability of present democratic
governments  to  take  adequate  political  action  is  seriously  questioned.  On  the  other  hand,
environmentalism is charged of being anti-democratic. This paper, in a first step, examines the
“green” criticism of and sometimes actual departures from democracy. Drawing on that analysis
as well as a pragmatist concept of democracy, the elements of an “ecological democracy” will be
outlined in a second step. Democracy, then, is not only a way of collective-problem solving, but
also a form of life that has an intrinsic value, even in the face of unresolvable problems and
failure. Striving for transformation and the best possible scenario nevertheless, finally, demands
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